Washington and Jerusalem are reeling after the arrest of a veteran CIA officer accused of secretly feeding Iran a stream of sensitive intelligence on Israel for five years, pᴀssing at least 31 classified “products” to handlers linked to the IRGC’s Quds Force.

The officer, a Middle East specialist with access to joint US–Israeli operations, was detained in a covert FBI sting after investigators traced unexplained cash flows, encrypted chats and late‑night meetings in European capitals. Court documents say he systematically pH๏τographed and exfiltrated sensitive reports, then funneled them to Tehran through cut‑outs posing as academic and business contacts.

Among the 31 compromised products, officials say, were operational summaries of Israeli covert actions, technical ᴀssessments of missile and air‑defence vulnerabilities, and profiles of senior Israeli intelligence officers. One leaked memo reportedly detailed a planned sabotage campaign against Iranian nuclear‑linked sites, forcing Jerusalem to abort or redesign key operations.

Inside Langley, an emergency “damage scrub” has been launched to determine how deeply Iran “read Israeli secrets” through the stolen material — and whether any human ᴀssets inside Iran or Lebanon were rolled up as a result. In Tel Aviv, furious security chiefs are demanding answers on how an ally’s officer with such broad access could run a double life for half a decade.

Prosecutors call the case “one of the most devastating penetrations of Western intelligence on the Iran–Israel file in recent memory.” For America’s spy world and its closest partner, the fallout is only beginning — and so is the hunt to find out what else, and who else, Iran has already seen.